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Number of items at this level: 66.

A

Abi Jaber, Eduardo and Villeneuve, StéphaneIdRef (2025) Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts. Finance and Stochastics, 29. 143–176-143–176.

Ablyatifov, Emin and Lukyanov, GeorgyIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-1672-610X (2026) Optimal Taxation under Imperfect Trust. TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1711, Toulouse

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X (2020) On the evolution of male competitiveness. IAST Working Paper, n. 20-105, Toulouse

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X (2020) On the evolution of male competitiveness. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1093, Toulouse

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X (2021) On the evolution of male competitiveness. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol.190. pp. 228-254.

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X, Lehmann, LaurentIdRef and Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0817-0285 (2018) Evolution of preferences in group-structured populations: genes, guns, and culture. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-888, Toulouse

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X and Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0817-0285 (2016) Evolution and Kantian morality. Games and Economic Behavior, n°98. pp. 56-67.

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X and Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0817-0285 (2023) Evolution and Kantian morality: a correction and addendum. TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1406, Toulouse

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X and Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0817-0285 (2015) Evolution leads to Kantian morality. TSE Working Paper, n. 14-504

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X and Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0817-0285 (2014) Evolutionarily stable strategies, preferences and moral values, in n-player Interactions. LERNA Working Paper, n. 14-07-408

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X and Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0817-0285 (2018) Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-955, Toulouse

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X and Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0817-0285 (2018) Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation. IAST Working Paper, n. 18-82, Toulouse

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X and Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0817-0285 (2012) Homo Moralis-Preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching. TSE Working Paper, n. 12-281

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X and Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0817-0285 (2012) Homo Moralis-Preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching. LERNA Working Paper, n. 12.17.374

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X and Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRef (2017) Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists. IAST Working Paper, n. 17-69, Toulouse

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X and Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0817-0285 (2017) Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists,. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-833, Toulouse

Alger, IngelaIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X, Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0817-0285 and Lehmann, LaurentIdRef (2020) Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture. Journal of Economic Theory, 185 (104951).

Attanasi, Giuseppe MarcoIdRef, Garcia-Gallego, Aurora, Georgantzis, NikolaosIdRef and Montesano, AldoIdRef (2010) Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals. TSE Working Paper, n. 10-192

Azova, Arina and Lukyanov, GeorgyIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-1672-610X (2025) Herding Prices: Social Learning and Dynamic Competition in Duopoly. TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1685, Toulouse

B

Bayer, PeterIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9420-026X (2023) Evolutionarily stable networks. TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1487, Toulouse

Bayer, PeterIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9420-026X, Herings, Jean-JacquesIdRef and Peeters, Ronald (2021) Farsighted manipulation and exploitation in networks. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 196 (n° 105311).

Biais, BrunoIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0220-9989, Bisière, ChristopheIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8051-077X, Bouvard, MatthieuIdRef and Casamatta, CatherineIdRef (2017) The blockchain folk theorem. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-817, Toulouse

Biais, BrunoIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0220-9989, Bisière, ChristopheIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8051-077X, Bouvard, MatthieuIdRef and Casamatta, CatherineIdRef (2019) The blockchain folk theorem. The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 32 (n° 5). pp. 1662-1715.

Bobtcheff, CatherineIdRef, Bolte, JérômeIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1676-8407 and Mariotti, ThomasIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0525-8743 (2015) Researcher's Dilemma. TSE Working Paper, n. 13-377, Toulouse

Bobtcheff, CatherineIdRef, Bolte, JérômeIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1676-8407 and Mariotti, ThomasIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0525-8743 (2017) Researcher's Dilemma -. Review of Economic Studies, 84 (3). pp. 969-1014.

Bobtcheff, CatherineIdRef and Mariotti, ThomasIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0525-8743 (2010) Potential Competition in Preemption Games. TSE Working Paper, n. 10-140, Toulouse

Bobtcheff, CatherineIdRef and Mariotti, ThomasIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0525-8743 (2012) Potential Competition in Preemption Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 75 (1). pp. 53-66.

Bonatti, Alessandro and Hörner, JohannesIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6736-973X (2017) Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 169. pp. 234-269.

Boyer, MarcelIdRef, Lasserre, Pierre and Moreaux, MichelIdRef (2010) A Dynamic Duopoly Investment Game under Uncertain Market Growth. TSE Working Paper, n. 10-171, Toulouse

C

Catonini, Emiliano and Penta, AntonioIdRef (2022) Backward induction reasoning beyond backward induction. TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1298

Cheikbossian, GuillaumeIdRef (2009) The Collective Action Problem: Within-Group Cooperation and Between-Group Competition in a Repeated Rent-Seeking Game. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-085, Toulouse

Cheikbossian, GuillaumeIdRef (2015) Dynamique de l’Action Collective, Taille du Groupe et Degré de Rivalité de la Rente. Revue d'Economie Politique, 125 (1). pp. 145-169.

Cheikbossian, GuillaumeIdRef and Mahenc, PhilippeIdRef (2012) Cooperation in the Presence of an Advantaged Outsider. TSE Working Paper, n. 13-390, Toulouse

Cheikbossian, GuillaumeIdRef and Mahenc, PhilippeIdRef (2018) On the Difficulty of Collusion in the Presence of a More Efficient Outsider. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 174 (4). pp. 595-628.

Cheikbossian, GuillaumeIdRef and Sand-Zantman, WilfriedIdRef (2008) Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring. IDEI Working Paper, n. 527

Cheikbossian, GuillaumeIdRef and Sand-Zantman, WilfriedIdRef (2011) Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring. Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, 101. pp. 327-346.

Cheredina, Darina and Lukyanov, GeorgyIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-1672-610X (2025) False Cascades and the Cost of Truth. TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1681, Toulouse

D

Dammann, Felix, Rodosthenous, Néofytos and Villeneuve, StéphaneIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3213-1905 (2024) A stochastic non-zero-sum game of controlling the debt-to-GDP ratio. Applied Mathematics & Optimization, vol. 90 (N° 52).

Dilmé, Francesc and Garrett, Daniel F.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9541-6612 (2019) Residual deterrence. Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 17 (n° 5). pp. 1654-1686.

E

Enache, AndreeaIdRef and Florens, Jean-PierreIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6708-5174 (2020) Identification and estimation in a third-price auction model. Econometric Theory, vol. 36 (n° 3). pp. 386-409.

G

Garrett, Daniel F.IdRef and Dilmé, Francesc (2019) Residual Deterrence. TSE Working Paper, n. 19-1029, Toulouse

Guo, Yingni and Hörner, JohannesIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6736-973X (2020) Dynamic Allocation without Money. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1133, Toulouse

Gyarmathy, Andrei and Lukyanov, GeorgyIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-1672-610X (2026) Peace Talk and Conflict Traps. TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1712, Toulouse

H

Hörner, JohannesIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6736-973X, Klein, Nicolas and Rady, Sven (2020) Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1132, Toulouse

Hörner, JohannesIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6736-973X and Lambert, Nicolas (2021) Motivational Ratings. Review of Economic Studies, vol.88 (n°4). pp. 1892-1935.

Hörner, JohannesIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6736-973X and Lovo, StefanoIdRef (2017) Belief-free Price Formation. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-790, Toulouse

Hörner, JohannesIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6736-973X, Lovo, StefanoIdRef and Tomala, TristanIdRef (2018) Belief-free Price Formation. Journal of Financial Economics, 127 (2). pp. 342-365.

Hörner, JohannesIdRef and Renault, JérômeIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2220-3143 (2023) A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring. TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1473, Toulouse

Hörner, JohannesIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6736-973X and Sanktjohanser, Anna (2022) Too Much of A Good Thing? TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1327, Toulouse, France

Hörner, JohannesIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6736-973X and Takahashi, Satoru (2017) How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? TSE Working Paper, n. 17-792, Toulouse

J

Jullien, BrunoIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5919-7835 and Park, In-Uck (2009) New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-086, Toulouse

Jullien, BrunoIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5919-7835 and Park, In-Uck (2014) New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility. Review of Economic Studies, vol. 81 (n° 4). pp. 1543-1574.

L

Li, David and Lukyanov, GeorgyIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-1672-610X (2025) Intergroup cooperation and reputation for honesty in an OLG framework. TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1687, Toulouse

Lukyanov, GeorgyIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-1672-610X (2025) Mutual Reputation and Trust in a Repeated Sender–Receiver Game. TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1688, Toulouse

Lukyanov, GeorgyIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-1672-610X and Ablyatifov, Emin (2025) Government Reputation in Ramsey Taxation. TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1682, Toulouse

Lukyanov, GeorgyIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-1672-610X, Shamruk, Konstantin and Logina, Ekaterina (2025) Endogenous Quality in Social Learning. TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1680, Toulouse

Lukyanov, GeorgyIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-1672-610X and Vlasova, Anna (2025) Dynamic Delegation with Reputation Feedback. TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1677, Toulouse

M

Mariotti, ThomasIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0525-8743, Schweizer, Nikolaus, Szech, Nora and von Wangenheim, Jonas (2018) Information nudges and self control. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-914, Toulouse.

Myerson, RogerIdRef and Weibull, Jörgen W.IdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0817-0285 (2015) Tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria. Econometrica, vol. 83 (n° 3). pp. 943-976.

N

Nöldeke, GeorgIdRef and Peña, JorgeIdRef (2018) Group size effects in social evolution. IAST working paper, n. 18-75, Toulouse

P

Peña, JorgeIdRef and Nöldeke, GeorgIdRef (2018) Group size effects in social evolution. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 457. pp. 211-220.

R

Renault, JérômeIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2220-3143 (2018) Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. In: Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems ScienceEncyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Meyers, Robert A. (ed.) Springer. ISBN 978-0-387-69572-3

Renault, JérômeIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2220-3143, Solan, EilonIdRef and Vieille, NicolasIdRef (2013) Dynamic sender–receiver games. Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (2). pp. 502-534.

Renault, JérômeIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2220-3143, Solan, EilonIdRef and Vieille, NicolasIdRef (2017) Optimal Dynamic Information Provision. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-749, Toulouse

Renault, JérômeIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2220-3143, Solan, EilonIdRef and Vieille, NicolasIdRef (2017) Optimal Dynamic Information Provision. Games and Economic Behavior, 104. pp. 329-349.

Ruble, Richard, Versaevel, BrunoIdRef and De Villemeur, Étienne (2010) Timing Vertical Relationships. TSE Working Paper, n. 10-181

This list was generated on Mon Mar 2 23:24:48 2026 CET.