A

Alger, Ingela (2020) On the evolution of male competitiveness. IAST Working Paper, n. 20-105, Toulouse

Alger, Ingela (2021) On the evolution of male competitiveness. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol.190. pp. 228-254.

Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2016) Evolution and Kantian morality. Games and Economic Behavior, n°98. pp. 56-67.

Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2023) Evolution and Kantian morality: a correction and addendum. TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1406, Toulouse

Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2014) Evolutionarily stable strategies, preferences and moral values, in n-player Interactions. LERNA Working Paper, n. 14-07-408

Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2018) Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation. IAST Working Paper, n. 18-82, Toulouse

Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2012) Homo Moralis-Preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching. LERNA Working Paper, n. 12.17.374

Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2017) Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists. IAST Working Paper, n. 17-69, Toulouse

Alger, Ingela, Weibull, Jörgen W. and Lehmann, Laurent (2020) Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture. Journal of Economic Theory, 185 (104951).

Attanasi, Giuseppe Marco, Garcia-Gallego, Aurora, Georgantzis, Nikolaos and Montesano, Aldo (2010) Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals. TSE Working Paper, n. 10-192

B

Bayer, Peter (2023) Evolutionarily stable networks. TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1487, Toulouse

Bayer, Peter, Herings, Jean-Jacques and Peeters, Ronald (2021) Farsighted manipulation and exploitation in networks. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 196 (n° 105311).

Biais, Bruno, Bisière, Christophe, Bouvard, Matthieu and Casamatta, Catherine (2019) The blockchain folk theorem. The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 32 (n° 5). pp. 1662-1715.

Bobtcheff, Catherine, Bolte, Jérôme and Mariotti, Thomas (2017) Researcher's Dilemma -. Review of Economic Studies, 84 (3). pp. 969-1014.

Bobtcheff, Catherine and Mariotti, Thomas (2012) Potential Competition in Preemption Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 75 (1). pp. 53-66.

Bonatti, Alessandro and Hörner, Johannes (2017) Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 169. pp. 234-269.

C

Catonini, Emiliano and Penta, Antonio (2022) Backward induction reasoning beyond backward induction. TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1298

Cheikbossian, Guillaume (2009) The Collective Action Problem: Within-Group Cooperation and Between-Group Competition in a Repeated Rent-Seeking Game. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-085, Toulouse

Cheikbossian, Guillaume (2015) Dynamique de l’Action Collective, Taille du Groupe et Degré de Rivalité de la Rente. Revue d'Economie Politique, 125 (1). pp. 145-169.

Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Mahenc, Philippe (2018) On the Difficulty of Collusion in the Presence of a More Efficient Outsider. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 174 (4). pp. 595-628.

Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2008) Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring. IDEI Working Paper, n. 527

Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2011) Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring. Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, 101. pp. 327-346.

D

Dammann, Felix, Rodosthenous, Néofytos and Villeneuve, Stéphane (2024) A stochastic non-zero-sum game of controlling the debt-to-GDP ratio. Applied Mathematics & Optimization, vol. 90 (N° 52).

Dilmé, Francesc and Garrett, Daniel F. (2019) Residual deterrence. Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 17 (n° 5). pp. 1654-1686.

E

Enache, Andreea and Florens, Jean-Pierre (2020) Identification and estimation in a third-price auction model. Econometric Theory, vol. 36 (n° 3). pp. 386-409.

G

Guo, Yingni and Hörner, Johannes (2020) Dynamic Allocation without Money. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1133, Toulouse

H

Hörner, Johannes, Klein, Nicolas and Rady, Sven (2020) Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1132, Toulouse

Hörner, Johannes and Lambert, Nicolas (2021) Motivational Ratings. Review of Economic Studies, vol.88 (n°4). pp. 1892-1935.

Hörner, Johannes, Lovo, Stefano and Tomala, Tristan (2018) Belief-free Price Formation. Journal of Financial Economics, 127 (2). pp. 342-365.

Hörner, Johannes and Renault, Jerôme (2023) A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring. TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1473, Toulouse

Hörner, Johannes and Sanktjohanser, Anna (2022) Too Much of A Good Thing? TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1327, Toulouse, France

Hörner, Johannes and Takahashi, Satoru (2017) How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? TSE Working Paper, n. 17-792, Toulouse

J

Jullien, Bruno and Park, In-Uck (2014) New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility. Review of Economic Studies, vol. 81 (n° 4). pp. 1543-1574.

M

Mariotti, Thomas, Schweizer, Nikolaus, Szech, Nora and von Wangenheim, Jonas (2018) Information nudges and self control. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-914, Toulouse.

Myerson, Roger and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2015) Tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria. Econometrica, vol. 83 (n° 3). pp. 943-976.

N

Nöldeke, Georg and Peña, Jorge (2018) Group size effects in social evolution. IAST working paper, n. 18-75, Toulouse

P

Peña, Jorge and Nöldeke, Georg (2018) Group size effects in social evolution. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 457. pp. 211-220.

R

Renault, Jérôme (2018) Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. In: Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems ScienceEncyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Meyers, Robert A. (ed.) Springer. ISBN 978-0-387-69572-3

Renault, Jérôme, Solan, Eilon and Vieille, Nicolas (2013) Dynamic sender–receiver games. Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (2). pp. 502-534.

Renault, Jérôme, Solan, Eilon and Vieille, Nicolas (2017) Optimal Dynamic Information Provision. Games and Economic Behavior, 104. pp. 329-349.

Ruble, Richard, Versaevel, Bruno and De Villemeur, Étienne (2010) Timing Vertical Relationships. TSE Working Paper, n. 10-181