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Bobtcheff, Catherine, Bolte, Jérôme
and Mariotti, Thomas
(2017)
Researcher's Dilemma -.
Review of Economic Studies, 84 (3).
pp. 969-1014.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
We model academic competition as a game in which researchers ¯ght for priority. Researchers privately experience breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas mature before making them public, thereby establishing priority. In a two-researcher, symmetric environment, the resulting preemption game has a unique equilibrium. We study how the shape of the breakthrough distribution affects equilibrium maturation delays. Making researchers better at discovering new ideas or at developing them has contrasted effects on the quality of research outputs. Finally, when researchers have different innovative abilities, speed of discovery and maturation of ideas are positively correlated in equilibrium.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 2017 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Academic Competition, Preemption Games, Private Information |
| JEL Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Sep 2016 08:04 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:53 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:30520 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22142 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Researcher's Dilemma. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:32)
- Researcher's Dilemma -. (deposited 09 Sep 2016 08:04) [Currently Displayed]
