Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2018) Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation. IAST working paper, n. 18-82, Toulouse

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Official URL : http://iast.fr/pub/32951

Abstract

The literature on the evolution of preferences of individuals in strategic interactions is vast and diverse. We organize the discussion around the following question: Supposing that material outcomes drive evolutionary success, under what circumstances does evolution promote Homo oeconomicus, defined as material self-interest, and when does it instead lead to other preferences? The literature suggests that Homo oeconomicus is favored by evolution only when individuals' preferences are their private information and the population is large and well-mixed so that individuals with rare mutant preferences almost never get to interact with each other. If rare mutants instead interact more often (say, due to local dispersion), evolution instead favors a certain generalization of Homo oeconomicus including a Kantian concern. If individuals interact under complete information about preferences, evolution destabilizes Homo oeconomicus in virtually all games.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: September 2018
Place of Publication: Toulouse
JEL Classification: C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior - Underlying Principles
D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Toulouse Capitole University
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 28 Sep 2018 14:45
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:58
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:32951
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26281
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