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Alger, Ingela
and Weibull, Jörgen W.
(2018)
Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation.
IAST Working Paper, n. 18-82, Toulouse
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Abstract
The literature on the evolution of preferences of individuals in strategic interactions is vast and diverse. We organize the discussion around the following question: Supposing that material outcomes drive evolutionary success, under what circumstances does evolution promote Homo oeconomicus, defined as material self-interest, and when does it instead lead to other preferences? The literature suggests that Homo oeconomicus is favored by evolution only when individuals' preferences are their private information and the population is large and well-mixed so that individuals with rare mutant preferences almost never get to interact with each other. If rare mutants instead interact more often (say, due to local dispersion), evolution instead favors a certain generalization of Homo oeconomicus including a Kantian concern. If individuals interact under complete information about preferences, evolution destabilizes Homo oeconomicus in virtually all games.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | September 2018 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| JEL Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games D01 - Microeconomic Behavior - Underlying Principles D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Toulouse Capitole University |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Sep 2018 14:45 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Jun 2023 07:40 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32951 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26281 |
