Vlasova, Anna
and Lukyanov, Georgy
(2025)
Endogenous Vindication: Reputation and Effort in Expert Advice.
TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1677, Toulouse
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Abstract
An expert’s advice is often evaluated only when a client acts, and the quality of
that evaluation depends on implementation effort. We study repeated advice by an
expert whose fixed ability is unknown to both the expert and the public. A favorable
recommendation may induce a short-lived client to undertake a costly project and choose
effort. Higher reputation elicits greater effort, making outcomes more informative about
ability. The expert therefore controls whether a reputation-dependent performance
test occurs, while the client controls its precision. With diminishing career returns
to reputation, the expert may withhold favorable advice even when implementation
creates positive surplus. Monotone exposure follows from broad smooth primitives when
implementation requires sufficiently high reputation, and from an explicit open family
of quadratic environments. Advice then follows a reputation cutoff; stronger career
concerns weakly raise it and can stop testing earlier. A low-ability expert eventually
enters an absorbing distrust region, while a high-ability expert is permanently distrusted
with positive probability and otherwise fully vindicated. Individually more informative
tests can therefore coexist with less learning overall because reputational incentives
reduce the number of tests conducted.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2025 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Dynamic delegation, expert advice, moral hazard, experimentation, reputational conservatism. |
| JEL Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Oct 2025 08:08 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Oct 2026 12:52 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:131008 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51279 |

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