Hörner, Johannes and Lambert, Nicolas (2021) Motivational Ratings. Review of Economic Studies, vol.88 (n°4). pp. 1892-1935.

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Identification Number : 10.1093/restud/rdaa070


Performance evaluation (“rating”) systems not only provide information to users but also motivate the rated worker. This article solves for the optimal (effort-maximizing) rating within the standard career concerns framework. We prove that this rating is a linear function of past observations. The rating, however,
is not a Markov process, but rather the sum of two Markov processes. We show how it combines information of different types and vintages. An increase in effort may adversely affect some (but not all) future ratings.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: July 2021
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Oxford
Uncontrolled Keywords: Career concerns, Mechanism design, Ratings
JEL Classification: C72 - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 24 Aug 2022 09:42
Last Modified: 24 Aug 2022 09:42
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:127224
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/46233

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