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Hörner, Johannes
and Lambert, Nicolas
(2021)
Motivational Ratings.
Review of Economic Studies, vol.88 (n°4).
pp. 1892-1935.
This is the latest version of this item.
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/127224
Identification Number : 10.1093/restud/rdaa070
Abstract
Performance evaluation (“rating”) systems not only provide information to users but also motivate the rated worker. This article solves for the optimal (effort-maximizing) rating within the standard career concerns framework. We prove that this rating is a linear function of past observations. The rating, however,
is not a Markov process, but rather the sum of two Markov processes. We show how it combines information of different types and vintages. An increase in effort may adversely affect some (but not all) future ratings.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2021 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Oxford |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Career concerns, Mechanism design, Ratings |
| JEL Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 24 Aug 2022 09:42 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Aug 2022 09:42 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:127224 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/46233 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Motivational Ratings. (deposited 31 Aug 2020 13:47)
- Motivational Ratings. (deposited 24 Aug 2022 09:42) [Currently Displayed]
