Alger, Ingela, Lehmann, Laurent and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2018) Evolution of preferences in group-structured populations: genes, guns, and culture. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-888, Toulouse

Warning
There is a more recent version of this item available.
[thumbnail of tse_wp888.pdf]
Preview
Text
Download (434kB) | Preview

Abstract

Humans have evolved in populations structured in groups that extended beyond the nuclear family. Individuals interacted with each other within these groups and there was limited migration and sometimes contacts between these groups. Suppose that during this evolution, individuals transmitted their behaviors or preferences to their (genetic or cultural) offspring, and that material outcomes resulting from the interaction determined which parents were more successful than others in producing (genetic or cultural) offspring. Should one then expect pure material self-interest to prevail? Some degree of altruism, spite, inequity aversion or morality? By building on established models in population biology we analyze the role that different aspects of population structures such as group size, migration rates, probability of group contacts, cultural loyalty towards parents’ play in shaping behaviors and preferences which, once established, cannot be displaced by any other preference. In particular, we establish that uninvadable preferences under limited migration between groups will consist of a materially self-interested, a moral, and an other-regarding component, and we show how the strength of each component depends on population structure.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: February 2018
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Strategic interactions, Preference evolution, Evolution by natural selection, Cultural transmission, Pro-sociality, Altruism, Morality, Spite
JEL Classification: A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
B52 - Institutional; Evolutionary
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior - Underlying Principles
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D64 - Altruism
D91 - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 24 Apr 2018 09:28
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:57
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:32436
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25835

Available Versions of this Item

View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year