Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2016) Evolution and Kantian morality. Games and Economic Behavior, n°98. pp. 56-67.

This is the latest version of this item.

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.006


What kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor? We propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size. Groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative. Individuals' preferences are their private information. The set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions. We show that a certain class of such preferences, that combine self-interest with morality of a Kantian flavor, are evolutionarily stable, and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable. We also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of Maynard Smith's and Price's (1973) notion of evolutionary stability of strategies.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: July 2016
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Preference evolution, Evolutionary stability, Assortativity, Morality, Homo moralis, Social preferences
JEL Classification: C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior - Underlying Principles
D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse), TSM Research (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 29 Nov 2016 10:14
Last Modified: 30 Nov 2023 09:49
OAI Identifier:

Available Versions of this Item

View Item