Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2015) Evolution leads to Kantian morality. TSE Working Paper, n. 14-504

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Abstract

We provide a generalized definition of evolutionary stability of heritable types in arbitrarily large symmetric interactions under random matching that may be assortative. We establish stability results when these types are strategies in games, and when they are preferences or moral values in games under incomplete information. We show that a class of moral preferences, with degree of morality equal to the index of assortativity are evolutionarily stable. In particular, selfishness is evolutionarily unstable when there is positive assortativity in the matching process. We establish that evolutionarily stable strategies are the same as those played in equilibrium by rational but partly morally motivated individuals, individuals with evolutionarily stable preferences. We provide simple and operational criteria for evolutionary stability and apply these to canonical examples.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 3 June 2015
Uncontrolled Keywords: evolutionary stability, assortativity, morality, homo moralis, public goods, contests, helping, Cournot competition
JEL Classification: C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior - Underlying Principles
D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:46
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:48
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:28319
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15952

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