Dilmé, Francesc and Garrett, Daniel F. (2019) Residual deterrence. Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 17 (n° 5). pp. 1654-1686.

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Identification Number : 10.1093/jeea/jvy034


Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in of- fending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential of- fenders. We do so by introducing to a standard inspection framework costs that must be incurred to commence enforcement. Such costs in practice include hiring specialized staff, undertaking targeted research and coordinating personnel. We illustrate how our model can be used to address a number of policy questions regarding the optimal design of enforcement authorities.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: October 2019
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: deterrence, reputation, switching costs
JEL Classification: C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D42 - Monopoly
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 17 Apr 2018 08:12
Last Modified: 02 Sep 2021 13:09
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:31908
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25637

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