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Dilmé, Francesc and Garrett, Daniel F.
(2019)
Residual deterrence.
Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 17 (n° 5).
pp. 1654-1686.
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Abstract
Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in of- fending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential of- fenders. We do so by introducing to a standard inspection framework costs that must be incurred to commence enforcement. Such costs in practice include hiring specialized staff, undertaking targeted research and coordinating personnel. We illustrate how our model can be used to address a number of policy questions regarding the optimal design of enforcement authorities.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2019 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | deterrence, reputation, switching costs |
| JEL Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games D42 - Monopoly |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Apr 2018 08:12 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Sep 2021 13:09 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:31908 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25637 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Residual Deterrence. (deposited 23 Jul 2019 06:31)
- Residual deterrence. (deposited 17 Apr 2018 08:12) [Currently Displayed]
