Ablyatifov, Emin and Lukyanov, Georgy
(2025)
Government Reputation and Fiscal Capacity.
TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1682, Toulouse
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Abstract
How does uncertain implementation shape fiscal policy over time? We study an uninformed fiscal authority that chooses a distortionary tax-financed mandate and audit intensity while a privately informed executive decides whether to deliver or divert the proceeds. Reputation is the Bayesian state variable linking current fiscal control to future capacity. In a two-period benchmark, a mandate is also an experiment: delivery sacrifices current rents but preserves future access. We prove that the dynamic activation threshold is no greater than the square of the static reputation cutoff; the bound is exact and independent of discounting in a linear-benefit, quadratic-cost economy. A positive trial mandate may therefore be optimal when every positive tax is statically undesirable. In the infinite-horizon model, posterior reputation is a bounded martingale and its one-step conditional variance admits an exact policy-dependent formula. Zero mandates can create closed inactive classes in which fiscal activity and learning stop together. On a finite approximation, we compute stationary equilibria with noisy signals, endogenous auditing, and spending-need shocks and certify them against every action in a common adaptive cloud. The equilibria display history-dependent limiting fiscal capacity, non-monotone auditing, and nonlinear responses to spending need: shocks leave mean reputation unchanged but alter its dispersion and exposure to the inactive region.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2025 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Optimal taxation, Government reputation, Ramsey problem, Credibility, Fiscal capacity |
| JEL Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information E62 - Fiscal Policy; Public Expenditures, Investment, and Finance; Taxation H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation H30 - General |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Oct 2025 11:31 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Oct 2026 10:10 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:131041 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51554 |

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