Ablyatifov, Emin and Lukyanov, Georgy (2025) Government Reputation and Fiscal Capacity. TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1682, Toulouse

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Abstract

How does uncertain implementation shape fiscal policy over time? We study an uninformed fiscal authority that chooses a distortionary tax-financed mandate and audit intensity while a privately informed executive decides whether to deliver or divert the proceeds. Reputation is the Bayesian state variable linking current fiscal control to future capacity. In a two-period benchmark, a mandate is also an experiment: delivery sacrifices current rents but preserves future access. We prove that the dynamic activation threshold is no greater than the square of the static reputation cutoff; the bound is exact and independent of discounting in a linear-benefit, quadratic-cost economy. A positive trial mandate may therefore be optimal when every positive tax is statically undesirable. In the infinite-horizon model, posterior reputation is a bounded martingale and its one-step conditional variance admits an exact policy-dependent formula. Zero mandates can create closed inactive classes in which fiscal activity and learning stop together. On a finite approximation, we compute stationary equilibria with noisy signals, endogenous auditing, and spending-need shocks and certify them against every action in a common adaptive cloud. The equilibria display history-dependent limiting fiscal capacity, non-monotone auditing, and nonlinear responses to spending need: shocks leave mean reputation unchanged but alter its dispersion and exposure to the inactive region.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: October 2025
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Optimal taxation, Government reputation, Ramsey problem, Credibility, Fiscal capacity
JEL Classification: C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
E62 - Fiscal Policy; Public Expenditures, Investment, and Finance; Taxation
H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H30 - General
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 20 Oct 2025 11:31
Last Modified: 21 Oct 2026 10:10
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:131041
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51554
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