Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2023) Evolution and Kantian morality: a correction and addendum. TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1406, Toulouse

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Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (Games and Economic Behavior, 2016) consists of two statements. The first establishes that Homo moralis with the right degree of morality is evolutionarily stable. The second statement is a claim about sufficient conditions for other goal functions to be evolutionarily unstable. However, the proof given for that claim presumes that all relevant sets are non-empty, while the hypothesis of the theorem does not guarantee that. We here prove instability under a stronger hypothesis that guarantees existence, and we also establish a new and closely related result. As a by-product, we also obtain an extension of Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (Econometrica, 2013).

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: January 2023
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Preference evolution, evolutionary stability, morality, Homon moralis.
JEL Classification: C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior - Underlying Principles
D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 03 Feb 2023 08:56
Last Modified: 11 Jan 2024 14:21
OAI Identifier:
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