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Hörner, Johannes
and Renault, Jerôme
(2023)
A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring.
TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1473, Toulouse
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/128536
Abstract
We adapt the methods from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) to finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Under a combination of (a slight strengthening of) the assumptions of Benoît and Krishna (1985) and those of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), a folk theorem follows. Three counterexamples show that our assumptions are tight.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | September 2023 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Repeated games |
| JEL Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 27 Sep 2023 08:05 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2023 08:06 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:128536 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/48274 |
