Cornière, Alexandre de and Taylor, GregORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4563-4862 (2025) Data and competition : a simple framework. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 56 (n° 4). pp. 494-510.

Bobtcheff, CatherineORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8125-2661, Lévy, Raphaël and Mariotti, ThomasORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0525-8743 (2025) Information Disclosure in Preemption Races: Blessing or (Winner's) Curse? RAND Journal of Economics, 56 (2). pp. 145-162.

Bonnet, CélineORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2722-5344, Bouamra-Mechemache, ZohraORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6977-4619 and Molina, Hugo (2025) The Buyer Power Effect of Retail Mergers: An Empirical Model of Bargaining with Equilibrium of Fear. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 56 (n°2). pp. 194-215.

Bisceglia, Michele and Piccolo, Salvatore (2025) On the ratchet effect with product market competition. RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 56 (N° 2). pp. 216-230.

Gomes, Renato and Pavan, Alessandro (2024) Price customization and targeting in matching markets. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 55 (n° 2). pp. 230-265.

Smolin, AlexORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4740-2376 (2023) Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 54 (n° 4). pp. 570-597.

Jeon, Doh-Shin and Choi, Jay PilORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9381-8412 (2023) Platform Design Biases in Ad-Funded Two-Sided Markets. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 54 (n° 2). pp. 240-267.

Crémer, Jacques, Biglaiser, Gary and Veiga, André (2022) Should I stay or should I go? Migrating away from an incumbent platform. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 53 (n° 3). pp. 453-483.

Halaburda, Hanna, Jullien, BrunoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5919-7835 and Yehezkel, Yaron (2020) Dynamic competition with network externalities: how history matters. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 51. pp. 3-31.

Chen, Zhijun and Rey, PatrickORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4141-2728 (2019) Competitive cross-subsidization. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 50 (n° 3). pp. 645-665.

Cornière, Alexandre deORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9835-3992 and Taylor, Greg (2019) A model of biased intermediation. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 50 (n° 4). pp. 854-882.

Willems, BertORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1926-2513 and Zwart, Gijsbert (2018) Optimal regulation of network expansion. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 49 (n° 1). pp. 23-42.

Jeon, Doh-ShinORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9381-8412 and Lefouili, YassineORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4966-7212 (2018) CrosslLicensing and competition. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 49 (n° 3). pp. 656-671.

Jullien, BrunoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5919-7835, Pouyet, Jérôme and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2017) An Offer You Can't Refuse: Early Contracting with Endogenous Threat. RAND Journal of Economics, 48 (3). pp. 733-748.

Cornière, Alexandre deORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9835-3992 and De Nijs, Romain (2016) Online advertising and privacy. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 47 (n° 1). pp. 48-72.

Dubois, PierreORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9077-6843, Mouzon, Olivier deORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-9303-808X, Scott Morton, Fiona and Seabright, PaulORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3725-3098 (2015) Market Size and Pharmaceutical Innovation. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 46 (n° 4). pp. 844-871.

Gomes, Renato (2014) Optimal auction design in two-sided markets. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 45 (n° 2). pp. 248-272.

Rey, PatrickORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4141-2728 and Whinston, Michael Dennis (2013) Does Retailer Power Lead to Exclusion? RAND Journal of Economics, 44 (1). pp. 75-81.

Farhi, Emmanuel, Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean (2013) Fear of Rejection? Tiered Certification and Transparency. RAND Journal of Economics, 44 (4). pp. 610-631.

Iossa, Elisabetta and Jullien, BrunoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5919-7835 (2012) The Market for Lawyers: On the Value of Information on the Quality of Legal Services. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 43 (n° 4). pp. 677-705.

Jeon, Doh-ShinORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9381-8412 and Menicucci, Domenico (2011) Interconnection among Academic Journal Websites: Multilateral versus Bilateral Interconnection. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 42 (n° 2). pp. 363-386.

Auray, Stéphane, Mariotti, ThomasORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0525-8743 and Moizeau, Fabien (2011) Dynamic Regulation of Quality. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 42 (n° 2). pp. 246-265.

Hagiu, Andrei and Jullien, BrunoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5919-7835 (2011) Why Do Intermediaries Divert Search? RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 42 (n° 2). pp. 337-362.

Bourjade, Sylvain and Jullien, BrunoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5919-7835 (2011) The Roles of Reputation and Transparency on the Behavior of Biased Experts. RAND Journal of Economics, 42 (3). pp. 575-594.

Bonnet, Céline and Dubois, PierreORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9077-6843 (2010) Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance. RAND Journal of Economics, 41 (1). pp. 139-164.

Martimort, DavidORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4185-8703 and Stole, Lars (2009) Market Participation under Delegated and Intrinsic Common Agency Games. RAND Journal of Economics.

Biais, BrunoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0220-9989 and Perotti, Enrico (2008) Entrepreneurs and New Ideas. RAND Journal of Economics, 39 (4). pp. 1105-1125.

Hurkens, Sjaak and Jeon, Doh-ShinORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9381-8412 (2008) A Retail Benchmarking Approach to Efficient Two-way Access Pricing: No Termination-Based Price Discrimination. RAND Journal of Economics, 39 (3). pp. 822-849.

Joskow, Paul L. and Tirole, Jean (2007) Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets. RAND Journal of Economics, 38 (1). pp. 60-84.

Chiao, Benjamin, Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean (2007) The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: an Empirical Analysis. RAND Journal of Economics, 38 (4). pp. 905-930.

Lerner, Josh, Strojwas, Marcin and Tirole, Jean (2007) The Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing Rules. RAND Journal of Economics, 38 (3). pp. 610-625.

Jullien, BrunoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5919-7835 and Rey, PatrickORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4141-2728 (2007) Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion. RAND Journal of Economics, 38 (4). pp. 983-1001.

Martimort, DavidORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4185-8703 and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2006) Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management Contracts for Public Utilities. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 37 (n° 4). pp. 763-782.

Hiriart, Yolande and Martimort, DavidORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4185-8703 (2006) The Benefits of Extended Liability. RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (2). pp. 562-582.

Joskow, Paul L. and Tirole, Jean (2006) Retail Electricity Competition. RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (4). pp. 799-815.

Rochet, Jean-CharlesORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0156-9787 and Tirole, Jean (2006) Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report. RAND Journal of Economics, 35 (3). pp. 645-667.

Chiappori, Pierre-André, Jullien, BrunoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5919-7835, Salanié, BernardORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7072-5811 and Salanié, FrançoisORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7062-9208 (2006) Asymmetric Information in Insurance: General Testable Implications. RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (4). pp. 783-798.

Kyle, Margaret (2006) The Role of Firm Characteristics in Pharmaceutical Product Launches. RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (3). pp. 602-618.

Jeon, Doh-ShinORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9381-8412 and Menicucci, Domenico (2005) Optimal Second-degree Price Discrimination and Arbitrage: On the Role of Asymmetric Information among Buyers. RAND Journal of Economics, 36 (2). pp. 337-360.

Dessi, RobertaORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7641-9129 (2005) Start-up Finance, Monitoring and Collusion. RAND Journal of Economics, 36 (2). pp. 255-274.

Jeon, Doh-ShinORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9381-8412, Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tirole, Jean (2004) On the Receiver Pays Principle. RAND Journal of Economics, 35 (1). pp. 85-110.

Rey, PatrickORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4141-2728 and Vergé, Thibaud (2004) Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts. RAND Journal of Economics, 35 (4). pp. 728-746.

Fève, PatrickORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-4064-7775, Friebel, Guido and Raith, Michael (2004) Abuse of Authority and Hierarchical Communication. RAND Journal of Economics, 35 (n°2). pp. 224-244.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Marcus, Scott, Rey, PatrickORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4141-2728 and Tirole, Jean (2003) Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle. RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (2). pp. 370-390.

Hausman, Jerry A., Leonard, Gregory K. and Tirole, Jean (2003) On Non-Exclusive Membership in Competing Joint Ventures. RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (1). pp. 43-62.

Caillaud, Bernard and Jullien, BrunoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5919-7835 (2003) Chicken and Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers. RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (2). pp. 521-552.

Mahenc, Philippe and Meunier, Valérie (2003) Forward Market and Signals of Quality. RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (3). pp. 478-494.

Faure-Grimaud, Antoine and Martimort, DavidORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4185-8703 (2003) Regulatory Inertia. RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (3). pp. 413-438.

Crampes, ClaudeORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6383-7738 and Langinier, Corinne (2002) Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases. RAND Journal of Economics, 33 (2). pp. 258-274.

Rochet, Jean-CharlesORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0156-9787 and Tirole, Jean (2002) Cooperation among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations. RAND Journal of Economics, 33 (4). pp. 1-22.

Gagnepain, Philippe and Ivaldi, MarcORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4244-7690 (2002) Incentive Regulatory Policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France. RAND Journal of Economics, 33 (4). pp. 605-629.

Joskow, Paul L. and Tirole, Jean (2000) Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks. RAND Journal of Economics, 31 (3). pp. 450-487.

Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (2000) Customer Poaching and Brand Switching. RAND Journal of Economics, 31 (4). pp. 634-657.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Martimort, DavidORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4185-8703 (1999) Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior. RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (2). pp. 232-262.

Alger, IngelaORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2436-512X (1999) Consumer strategies limiting the monopolist's power: mulitple and joint purchases. RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (4). pp. 736-757.

Boyer, Marcel and Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1999) Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation. RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (1). pp. 137-157.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Rey, PatrickORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4141-2728 and Tirole, Jean (1998) Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (1). pp. 1-37.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Rey, PatrickORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4141-2728 and Tirole, Jean (1998) Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination. RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (1). pp. 38-56.

Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (1998) Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks. RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (2). pp. 235-258.

Curien, Nicolas, Jullien, BrunoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5919-7835 and Rey, PatrickORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4141-2728 (1998) Pricing Regulation under Bypass Competition. RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (2). pp. 259-279.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Martimort, DavidORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4185-8703 (1998) Collusion and Delegation. RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (2). pp. 280-305.

Martimort, DavidORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4185-8703 (1996) Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory. RAND Journal of Economics, 27 (1). pp. 1-31.

Rey, PatrickORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4141-2728 and Stiglitz, Joseph (1995) The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition. RAND Journal of Economics, 26. pp. 431-451.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tirole, Jean (1988) Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers. RAND Journal of Economics, 19 (4). pp. 516-537.

Caillaud, Bernard, Guesnerie, Roger, Rey, PatrickORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4141-2728 and Tirole, Jean (1988) Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions. RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (1). pp. 1-26.

Crémer, Jacques and Riordan, Michael (1987) On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts. RAND Journal of Economics, 18 (3). pp. 436-451.

Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (1986) A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation. RAND Journal of Economics, 17 (3). pp. 366-376.

Crémer, Jacques (1984) The Economics of Repeat Buying. RAND Journal of Economics, 15 (3). pp. 396-403.