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Jeon, Doh-Shin
and Choi, Jay Pil
(2023)
Platform Design Biases in Ad-Funded Two-Sided Markets.
RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 54 (n° 2).
pp. 240-267.
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Abstract
We investigate how platform market power affects platforms' design choices in ad-funded two-sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and extract surplus on the advertising side. We consider design choices affecting both sides in opposite ways and compare private incentives with social incentives. Platforms' design biases depend crucially on whether they can charge any price on the consumer side. We apply the framework to technology adoption, privacy, and ad load choices. Our results provide a rationale for a tougher competition policy to curb market power of ad-funded platforms with free services.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | August 2023 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| JEL Classification: | D4 - Market Structure and Pricing L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Apr 2023 08:00 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Feb 2024 10:23 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:126710 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/44837 |
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- Platform Design Biases in Ad-Funded Two-Sided Markets. (deposited 13 Apr 2023 08:00) [Currently Displayed]
