Jeon, Doh-Shin and Lefouili, Yassine (2018) CrosslLicensing and competition. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 49 (n° 3). pp. 656-671.

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Identification Number : 10.1111/1756-2171.12248


We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross-licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross-licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms who can enter into a cross-licensing agreement. We also investigate the scenario in which a cross-licensing contract cannot involve the payment of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the licensed technology. Finally, policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements are derived.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2018
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Cross-Licensing, Royalties, Collusion, Antitrust and Intellectual Property
JEL Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
O34 - Intellectual Property Rights - National and International Issues
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 22 May 2018 13:10
Last Modified: 17 Jun 2021 12:39
OAI Identifier:

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