Jeon, Doh-Shin and Lefouili, Yassine (2018) CrosslLicensing and competition. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 49 (n° 3). pp. 656-671.
This is the latest version of this item.
Preview |
Text
Download (295kB) | Preview |
Abstract
We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross-licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross-licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms who can enter into a cross-licensing agreement. We also investigate the scenario in which a cross-licensing contract cannot involve the payment of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the licensed technology. Finally, policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements are derived.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Language: | English |
Date: | 2018 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Cross-Licensing, Royalties, Collusion, Antitrust and Intellectual Property |
JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices O34 - Intellectual Property Rights - National and International Issues |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 22 May 2018 13:10 |
Last Modified: | 17 Jun 2021 12:39 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32601 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25902 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Cross-Licensing and Competition. (deposited 21 Sep 2015 13:08)
- CrosslLicensing and competition. (deposited 22 May 2018 13:10) [Currently Displayed]