Article

Jullien, Bruno, Rey, Patrick and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2013) Termination fees revisited. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31 (n°6). pp. 738-750.

Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2013) Public-Private Interplay in the telecom industry. Communications & Strategies, 91 (3).

Martimort, David, Poudou, Jean-Christophe and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2011) Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process. The Annals of Economics and Statistics, 101. pp. 287-306.

Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2011) Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring. Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, 101. pp. 327-346.

Martimort, David, Poudou, Jean-Christophe and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2010) Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information. The Journal Of Industrial Economics, 58 (n°2). pp. 324-348.

Martimort, David and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2006) Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management Contracts for Public Utilities. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 37 (n° 4). pp. 763-782.

Casamatta, Georges and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2005) Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information. B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Topics), 5 (1).

Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2004) Economic Integration and Political Accountability. European Economic Review, 48 (5). pp. 1001-1025.

Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2002) Constitutional Design and Regional Favoritism. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 4 (1). pp. 71-93.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2002) Information Acquisition, Political Game and the Delegation of Authority. European Journal of Political Economy, 18 (3). pp. 407-428.

Casamatta, Georges and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2002) Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique. Revue Économique, 53 (3). pp. 537-544.

Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2000) Choix constitutionnel et délégation stratégique. Revue d'Économie Politique, 110 (5). pp. 683-700.

Monograph

Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2008) Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring. IDEI Working Paper, n. 527