Jullien, Bruno and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2018) Internet regulation, two-sided pricing, and sponsored data. International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 58. pp. 31-62.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.007


We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks'incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid contents).

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: May 2018
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Amsterdam
Uncontrolled Keywords: Internet, Neutrality
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L86 - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 22 May 2018 09:28
Last Modified: 29 Nov 2021 13:36
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:32525
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25869

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