Jullien, Bruno and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2018) Internet regulation, two-sided pricing, and sponsored data. International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 58. pp. 31-62.
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Abstract
We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks'incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid contents).
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | May 2018 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Place of Publication: | Amsterdam |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Internet, Neutrality |
JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information L51 - Economics of Regulation L86 - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 22 May 2018 09:28 |
Last Modified: | 29 Nov 2021 13:36 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32525 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25869 |
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Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:28)
- Internet regulation, two-sided pricing, and sponsored data. (deposited 22 May 2018 09:28) [Currently Displayed]