Jullien, Bruno and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2017) Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data. TSE Working Paper, n. 12-327, Toulouse

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Abstract

We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks'incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid contents).

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: March 2017
Place of Publication: Toulouse
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues)
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:28
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:47
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:26061
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15360

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