Jullien, Bruno and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried
(2017)
Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data.
TSE Working Paper, n. 12-327, Toulouse

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Abstract
We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks'incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid contents).
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Language: | English |
Date: | March 2017 |
Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues) |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:28 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:47 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:26061 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15360 |
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- Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:28) [Currently Displayed]