Le Breton, Michel, Shapoval, Alexander and Weber, Shlomo (2020) A Game-Theoretical Model of the Landscape Theory. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1113, Toulouse

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In this paper we examine a game-theoretical generalization of the landscape theory introduced by Axelrod and Bennett (1993). In their two-bloc setting each player ranks the blocs on the basis of the sum of her individual evaluations of members of the group. We extend the Axelrod-Bennett setting by allowing an arbitrary number of blocs and expanding the set of possible deviations to include multi-country gradual deviations. We show that a Pareto optimal landscape equilibrium which is immune to profitable gradual deviations always exists. We also indicate that while a landscape equilibrium is a stronger concept than Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, it is weaker than strong Nash equilibrium.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: June 2020
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Landscape theory, landscape equilibrium, blocs, gradual deviation, potential functions, hedonic games
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 12 Jun 2020 10:00
Last Modified: 16 Feb 2021 08:22
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:124373
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/35054

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