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Le Breton, Michel
, Shapoval, Alexander and Weber, Shlomo
(2020)
A Game-Theoretical Model of the Landscape Theory.
TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1113, Toulouse
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Abstract
In this paper we examine a game-theoretical generalization of the landscape theory introduced by Axelrod and Bennett (1993). In their two-bloc setting each player ranks the blocs on the basis of the sum of her individual evaluations of members of the group. We extend the Axelrod-Bennett setting by allowing an arbitrary number of blocs and expanding the set of possible deviations to include multi-country gradual deviations. We show that a Pareto optimal landscape equilibrium which is immune to profitable gradual deviations always exists. We also indicate that while a landscape equilibrium is a stronger concept than Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, it is weaker than strong Nash equilibrium.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | June 2020 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Landscape theory, landscape equilibrium, blocs, gradual deviation, potential functions, hedonic games |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Jun 2020 10:00 |
| Last Modified: | 16 Feb 2021 08:22 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:124373 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/35054 |
Available Versions of this Item
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A Game-theoretical Model of the Landscape Theory. (deposited 02 Mar 2021 15:08)
- A Game-Theoretical Model of the Landscape Theory. (deposited 12 Jun 2020 10:00) [Currently Displayed]
