Le Breton, Michel, Shapoval, Alexander and Weber, Shlomo (2021) A Game-theoretical Model of the Landscape Theory. Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 92. pp. 41-46.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.11.004


In this paper we examine a game-theoretical generalization of the landscape theory introduced by Axelrod and Bennett (1993). In their two-bloc setting each player ranks the blocs on the basis of the sum of her individual evaluations of members of the group. We extend the Axelrod–Bennett setting by allowing an arbitrary number of blocs and expanding the set of possible deviations to include multi-country gradual deviations. We show that a Pareto optimal landscape equilibrium which is immune to profitable gradual deviations always exists. We also indicate that while a landscape equilibrium is a stronger concept than Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, it is weaker than strong Nash equilibrium.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: January 2021
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Amsterdam
Uncontrolled Keywords: Landscape theory, Landscape equilibrium, Blocs, Gradual deviation, Potential functions, Hedonic games
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 02 Mar 2021 15:08
Last Modified: 13 Mar 2021 12:27
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:125133
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/42253

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