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Attar, Andrea
, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François
(2017)
Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection.
TSE Working Paper, n. 17-788, Toulouse
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Abstract
This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We rst provide a general necessary and sucient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprotable. We then use this result to characterize, for an active market, a unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by a market tari making additional trades with an entrant unprotable. Motivated by the recursive structure of this allocation, we nally show that it emerges as the essentially unique equilibrium outcome of a discriminatory ascending auction. These results yield sharp predictions for competitive nonexclusive markets
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | March 2017 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Adverse Selection, Entry-Proofness, Discriminatory Pricing, Nonexclusive, Markets, Ascending Auctions |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D86 - Economics of Contract - Theory |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse), TSM Research (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 24 Mar 2017 13:33 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Apr 2021 07:59 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:31582 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/23268 |
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