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Attar, Andrea
, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François
(2021)
Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection.
American Economic Review, vol. 111 (n° 8).
pp. 2623-2659.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We rst provide a general necessary and sucient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprotable. We then use this result to characterize, for an active market, a unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by a market tari making additional trades with an entrant unprotable. Motivated by the recursive structure of this allocation, we nally show that it emerges as the essentially unique equilibrium outcome of a discriminatory ascending auction. These results yield sharp predictions for competitive nonexclusive markets.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | August 2021 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Cambridge, Mass. |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Adverse Selection, Entry-Proofness, Discriminatory Pricing, Nonexclusive, Markets, Ascending Auctions. |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D86 - Economics of Contract - Theory |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Sep 2021 14:50 |
| Last Modified: | 10 Feb 2022 14:55 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:125468 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43207 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection. (deposited 24 Mar 2017 13:33)
- Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection. (deposited 23 Sep 2021 14:50) [Currently Displayed]
