Browse by JEL Subject

A

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2017) Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-788, Toulouse

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2014) Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets. TSE Working Paper, n. 14-532, Toulouse

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2016) On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing. TSE Working Paper, n. 16-737, Toulouse

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2019) On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing. Theoretical Economics, vol. 14 (n° 1). pp. 297-343.

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2019) Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection. TSE Working Paper, n. 19-1033, Toulouse

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2019) The Social Costs of Side Trading. TSE Working Paper, n. 19-1017, Toulouse

Auriol, Emmanuelle and Miquel-Florensa, Josepa (2019) Taxing Fragmented Aid to Improve Aid efficiency. The Review of International Organizations, vol. 14 (n° 3). pp. 1-25.

B

Biais, Bruno, Mariotti, Thomas, Rochet, Jean-Charles and Villeneuve, Stéphane (2010) Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard. Econometrica, 78 (1). pp. 73-118.

D

Dessi, Roberta (2009) Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-075

Dessi, Roberta (2011) Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts. TSE Working Paper, n. 11-253, Toulouse

Dessi, Roberta and Yin, Nina (2015) Venture Capital and Knowledge Transfer. TSE Working Paper, n. 15-555

E

Enache, Andreea and Florens, Jean-Pierre (2018) Non Parametric Estimation for Regulation Models. The Annals of Economics and Statistics, 131. pp. 45-58.

Evans, Robert and Reiche, Soenje (2015) Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation. Journal of Economic Theory, 157. pp. 1159-1187.

F

Friebel, Guido and Schnedler, Wendelin (2007) Team Governance: Empowerment of Hierarchical Control. IDEI Working Paper, n. 520

G

Gagnepain, Philippe, Ivaldi, Marc and Martimort, David (2010) The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector. TSE Working Paper, n. 10-190

Gagnepain, Philippe, Ivaldi, Marc and Martimort, David (2013) The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector. American Economic Review, 103 (6). pp. 2352-2383.

Gersbach, Hans and Rochet, Jean-Charles (2012) Aggregate Investment Externalities and Macroprudential Regulation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 44. pp. 73-109.

Gersbach, Hans and Rochet, Jean-Charles (2017) Capital Regulation and Credit Fluctuations. Journal of Monetary Economics, 90. pp. 113-124.

I

Iossa, Elisabetta and Rey, Patrick (2014) Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration. Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 12 (n° 3). pp. 549-574.

M

Miquel-Florensa, Josepa (2013) Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans’s dilemma. Theory and Decision, 74 (1). pp. 151-166.

Moriya, Fumitoshi and Yamashita, Takuro (2018) Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-941, Toulouse

S

Sand-Zantman, Wilfried and Dosis, Anastasios (2019) The Ownership of Data. TSE Working Paper, n. 19-1025, Toulouse

Sarkisian, Roberto (2017) Team Incentives under Moral and Altruistic Preferences: Which Team to Choose? TSE Working Paper, n. 17-838, Toulouse

T

Tirole, Jean (2008) Cognition and Incomplete Contracts. IDEI Working Paper, n. 453

Tirole, Jean (2009) Cognition and Incomplete Contracts. American Economic Review (AER), 99 (1). pp. 265-294.

U

Ulbricht, Robert (2016) Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard. Theoretical Economics, 11 (1). pp. 253-278.

Y

Yamashita, Takuro (2015) Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies, with Applications to Auctions and Bilateral Trade. Review of Economic Studies, 82 (3). pp. 1223-1246.

Yamashita, Takuro (2015) Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 159. pp. 267-279.