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Moriya, Fumitoshi and Yamashita, Takuro
(2018)
Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure.
TSE Working Paper, n. 18-941, Toulouse
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32884
Abstract
In the context of team production, this paper studies the optimal (deterministic and stochastic) information allocation that implements desired effort levels as the unique Bayesian equilibrium. We show that, under certain conditions, it is optimal to asymmetrically inform agents even though they may be ex ante symmetric. The main intuition is that informing the agents asymmetrically can be effective in avoiding "bad" equilibria, that is, equilibria with coordination failure.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2018 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Moral hazard, Unique implementation, Asymmetric information allocation |
| JEL Classification: | D21 - Firm Behavior D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D86 - Economics of Contract - Theory |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Jul 2018 07:59 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:58 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32884 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26155 |
