Bayer, Peter, Kozics, György and Szöke, Nora Gabriella (2023) Best-response dynamics in directed network games. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 213 (n° 105720).

Garrett, Daniel F., Georgiadis, George, Smolin, Alexey and Szentes, Balazs (2023) Optimal technology design. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 209.

Décamps, Jean-Paul and Villeneuve, Stéphane (2022) Learning about profitability and dynamic cash management. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 205.

Bayer, Peter, Herings, Jean-Jacques and Peeters, Ronald (2021) Farsighted manipulation and exploitation in networks. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 196 (n° 105311).

Gollier, Christian (2021) A general theory of risk apportionment. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 192 (n° 105189).

Alger, Ingela, Weibull, Jörgen W. and Lehmann, Laurent (2020) Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture. Journal of Economic Theory, 185 (104951).

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenaël (2019) Private communication in competing mechanism games. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 183. pp. 258-283.

Nocke, Volker and Rey, Patrick (2018) Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 177. pp. 183-221.

Bonatti, Alessandro and Hörner, Johannes (2017) Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 169. pp. 234-269.

Garrett, Daniel F. and Pavan, Alessandro (2015) Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Variational Approach. Journal of Economic Theory, 159. pp. 775-818.

Farhi, Emmanuel and Tirole, Jean (2015) Liquid Bundles. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 158. pp. 634-655.

Bianchi, Milo and Jehiel, Philippe (2015) Financial reporting and market efficiency with extrapolative investors. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 157. pp. 842-878.

Cherbonnier, Frédéric and Gollier, Christian (2015) Decreasing Aversion under Ambiguity. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 157. pp. 606-623.

Evans, Robert and Reiche, Soenje (2015) Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation. Journal of Economic Theory, 157. pp. 1159-1187.

Yamashita, Takuro (2015) Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 159. pp. 267-279.

Biglaiser, Gary, Crémer, Jacques and Dobos, Gergely (2013) The value of switching costs. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 148 (n° 3). pp. 935-952.

Renault, Jérôme, Solan, Eilon and Vieille, Nicolas (2013) Dynamic sender–receiver games. Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (2). pp. 502-534.

Le Breton, Michel, Michelangeli, Alessandra and Peluso, Eugenio (2012) A Stochastic Dominance Approach to the measurement of Discrimination. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 147. pp. 1342-1350.

Bramoullé, Yann and Saint-Paul, Gilles (2010) Research Cycles. Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (5). pp. 1890-1920.

Gollier, Christian (2010) Ecological Discounting. Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (2). pp. 812-829.

Martimort, David and Stole, Lars (2009) Selecting Equilibria in Common Agency Games. Journal of Economic Theory, vol.144 (n°2). pp. 604-634.

Dreze, Jacques, Le Breton, Michel, Savvateev, Alexei and Weber, Shlomo (2008) "Almost" Subsidy-Free Spatial Pricing in a Multi-Dimensional Setting. Journal of Economic Theory, 143 (n°1). pp. 275-291.

Mathis, Jérôme (2008) Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion. Journal of Economic Theory, 143. pp. 571-584.

Saint-Paul, Gilles (2007) Knowledge Hierarchies in the Labor Market. Journal of Economic Theory, 137 (1). pp. 104-126.

Dreze, Jacques, Le Breton, Michel and Weber, Shlomo (2007) Rawlsian Pricing of Access to Public Facilities: A Unidimensional Illustration. Journal of Economic Theory, 136. pp. 759-766.

Attar, Andrea, Piaser, Gwenaël and Porteiro, Nicolas (2007) Negotiation and Take-it or Leave-it offers with Non-Contractible Actions. Journal of Economic Theory, 135 (1). pp. 590-593.

Khalil, Fahad, Martimort, David and Parigi, Bruno M. (2007) Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting. Journal of Economic Theory, 135 (n°1). pp. 35-67.

Crémer, Jacques, Spiegel, Yossi and Zheng, Charles Z. (2007) Optimal Search Auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 134. pp. 226-248.

Luttmer, Erzo G.J. and Mariotti, Thomas (2007) Efficiency and Equilibrium when Preferences are Time-Inconsistent. Journal of Economic Theory, 132 (1). pp. 493-506.

Beaudry, Paul and Portier, Franck (2007) When can Changes in Expectations Cause Business Cycle Fluctuations in Neo-Classical Settings? Journal of Economic Theory, 135 (1). pp. 458-477.

Ambec, Stefan (2007) Sequential Communication with ex post Participation Constraints. Journal of Economic Theory, 137 (1). pp. 733-744.

Gromb, Denis Emmanuel and Martimort, David (2007) Collusion and the Organization of Delegated Expertise. Journal of Economic Theory, vol.137 (n°1). pp. 271-299.

Banks, Jeffrey S., Duggan, John and Le Breton, Michel (2006) Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model. Journal of Economic Theory, 126 (1). pp. 194-234.

Battaglini, Marco, Bénabou, Roland and Tirole, Jean (2005) Self-Control in Peer Groups. Journal of Economic Theory, 123 (2). pp. 105-134.

Décamps, Jean-Paul and Mariotti, Thomas (2004) Investment Timing and Learning Externalities. Journal of Economic Theory, 118 (1). pp. 80-102.

Haimanko, Ori, Le Breton, Michel and Weber, Shlomo (2004) Voluntary Formation of Communities for the Provision of Public Projects. Journal of Economic Theory, 115 (1). pp. 1-34.

Crémer, Jacques, D'Aspremont, Claude and Gérard-Varet, Louis-André (2004) Balanced Bayesian Mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, vol.115 (n°2). pp. 385-396.

Mahenc, Philippe and Salanié, François (2004) Softening Competition through Forward Trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 116 (2). pp. 282-293.

Versaevel, Bruno and De Villemeur, Étienne (2003) From Private to Public Common Agency. Journal of Economic Theory, 111 (2). pp. 305-309.

Gollier, Christian (2002) Time Horizon and the Discount Rate. Journal of Economic Theory, 107 (2). pp. 463-473.

Ambec, Stefan and Sprumont, Yves (2002) Sharing a River. Journal of Economic Theory, 107 (2). pp. 453-462.

Hellwig, Christian (2002) Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games. Journal of Economic Theory, 107 (2). pp. 191-222.

Banks, Jeffrey S., Duggan, John and Le Breton, Michel (2002) Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections. Journal of Economic Theory, 103. pp. 88-105.

Dutta, Bhaskar, Jackson, Matthew O. and Le Breton, Michel (2002) Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy in Committees. Journal of Economic Theory, 103. pp. 190-218.

Maskin, Eric and Tirole, Jean (2001) Markov Perfect Equilibrium I: Observable Actions. Journal of Economic Theory, 100 (2). pp. 191-219.

Laussel, Didier and Le Breton, Michel (2001) Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency. Journal of Economic Theory, 100. pp. 93-128.

Jullien, Bruno (2000) Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models. Journal of Economic Theory, vol.93 (n°1). pp. 1-47.

Ghirardato, P. and Le Breton, Michel (2000) Choquet Rationality. Journal of Economic Theory, 90. pp. 277-285.

Konishi, H., Le Breton, Michel and Weber, Shlomo (1999) On Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria in Common Agency Games. Journal of Economic Theory, 85. pp. 122-139.

Martimort, David (1999) Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators. Journal of Economic Theory, 88 (2). pp. 261-294.

Jullien, Bruno and Picard, Pierre M. (1998) A Classical Model of Involuntary Unemployment: Efficiency Wages and Macroeconomic Policy. Journal of Economic Theory, 78 (2). pp. 263-285.

Konishi, H., Le Breton, Michel and Weber, Shlomo (1998) Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy. Journal of Economic Theory, 79. pp. 224-244.

Crémer, Jacques, Khalil, Fahad and Rochet, Jean-Charles (1998) Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered. Journal of Economic Theory, vol.81. pp. 163-200.

Amigues, Jean-Pierre, Favard, Pascal, Gaudet, Gérard and Moreaux, Michel (1998) On the Optimal Order of Natural Resource Use when the Capacity of the Inexhaustible Substitute is Limited. Journal of Economic Theory, 80. pp. 153-170.

Konishi, H., Le Breton, Michel and Weber, Shlomo (1997) Equilibrium in a Model with Partial Rivalry. Journal of Economic Theory, 72. pp. 225-237.

Laffond, Gilbert, Laslier, Jean-François and Le Breton, Michel (1997) A Theorem on Two-Player Symmetric Zero-Sum Games. Journal of Economic Theory, 72. pp. 426-431.

Gollier, Christian, Lindsey, J. and Zeckhauser, Richard (1997) Investment Flexibility and the Acceptance of Risk. Journal of Economic Theory. pp. 219-242.

Le Breton, Michel, Moyes, P. and Trannoy, Alain (1996) Inequality Reducing Properties of Composite Taxation. Journal of Economic Theory, 69. pp. 71-103.

Duggan, John and Le Breton, Michel (1996) Dutta's Minimal Covering Set and Shapley's Saddles. Journal of Economic Theory, 70. pp. 257-265.

Gollier, Christian (1995) The Comparative Statics of Changes in Risk Revisited. Journal of Economic Theory, 66. pp. 522-536.

Epstein, L. and Le Breton, Michel (1993) Dynamically Consistent Beliefs must be Bayesian. Journal of Economic Theory, 61. pp. 1-22.

Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (1991) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 53 (2). pp. 236-260.

Crémer, Jacques, D'Aspremont, Claude and Gérard-Varet, Louis-André (1990) Incentives and the Existence of Pareto-Optimal Revelation Mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, vol.51 (n°2). pp. 233-254.

Bordes, Georges and Le Breton, Michel (1989) Arrovian Theorems with Private Alternatives Domains and Selfish Individuals. Journal of Economic Theory, 47. pp. 257-281.

Jullien, Bruno (1988) Competitive Business Cycles in an Overlapping Generation Economy with Productive Investment. Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1). pp. 45-65.

Maskin, Eric and Tirole, Jean (1987) Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots. Journal of Economic Theory, 43 (2). pp. 364-373.

Le Breton, Michel and Trannoy, Alain (1987) Measures of Inequality as An Aggregation of Individual Preferences About Income Distributions: the Arrowian Case. Journal of Economic Theory, 41. pp. 248-269.

Le Breton, Michel (1987) On the Generic Nonexistence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Continuous Games. Journal of Economic Theory, 43. pp. 374-382.

Tirole, Jean (1984) On the Efficiency of Fixed Price Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 32 (2). pp. 317-327.

Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (1983) Capital as a Commitment: Strategic Investment to Deter Mobility. Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (2). pp. 227-250.

Crémer, Jacques (1982) A Simple Proof of Blackwell's 'Comparison of Experiments' Theorem. Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (2). pp. 439-443.

Guesnerie, Roger and Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1978) Taxing Price Makers. Journal of Economic Theory, 19 (2). pp. 423-455.

Green, Jerry and Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1978) Satisfactory Mechanisms for Environments with Consumption Lower Bounds. Journal of Economic Theory, 19 (2). pp. 359-375.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1976) Risk, Stochastic Preference and the Value of Information: a Comment. Journal of Economic Theory, 12 (3). pp. 483-487.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1975) Optimism and Experts against Adverse Selection in a Competitive Economy. Journal of Economic Theory, 10 (3). pp. 284-308.

Helpman, Elhanan and Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1975) On Moral Hazard in General Equilibrium Theory. Journal of Economic Theory, 10 (1). pp. 8-23.