Mathis, Jérôme (2008) Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion. Journal of Economic Theory, 143. pp. 571-584.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002
Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: November 2008
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 05:53
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:35
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:20707
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/2312
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