Mathis, Jérôme
(2008)
Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion.
Journal of Economic Theory, 143.
pp. 571-584.
Preview |
Text
Download (180kB) | Preview |
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/20707
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | November 2008 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 05:53 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:35 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:20707 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/2312 |

Tools
Tools
