2003

Attar, Andrea and Campioni, Eloisa (2003) Costly State Verification and Debt Contracts: a Critical Resume. Research in Economics, 57 (n°4). pp. 315-343.

2004

Attar, Andrea (2004) Financial Constraints and Economic Fluctuations. Rivista Italiana Degli Economisti (n°2). pp. 334-358.

2005

Attar, Andrea and Campioni, Eloisa (2005) Credit Cycles in a Neo-Austrian Economy. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 18 (2). pp. 249-269.

2006

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenaël (2006) Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market. B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 6 (1).

2007

Attar, Andrea, Piaser, Gwenaël and Porteiro, Nicolas (2007) Negotiation and Take-it or Leave-it offers with Non-Contractible Actions. Journal of Economic Theory, 135 (1). pp. 590-593.

Attar, Andrea, Piaser, Gwenaël and Porteiro, Nicolas (2007) A Note on Common Agency Models of Moral Hazard. Economics Letters, 95 (2). pp. 278-284.

2008

Attar, Andrea, Majumdar, Dipjyoti, Piaser, Gwenaël and Porteiro, Nicolas (2008) Common Agency Games: Separable Preferences and Indifference. Mathematical Social Sciences, 56 (1). pp. 75-95.

2010

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa, Piaser, Gwenaël and Rajan, Uday (2010) On Multiple-Principal Multiple-Agent Models of Moral Hazard. Games and Economic Behavior, 68 (1). pp. 376-380.

2012

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa, Piaser, Gwenaël and Rajan, Uday (2012) Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness. Review of Economic Design, 16 (4). pp. 283-296.

2013

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenaël (2013) Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 49 (1). pp. 62-70.

2017

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenaël (2017) On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-863, Toulouse

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2017) Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-788, Toulouse

2018

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2018) Concurrence non exclusive et sélection adverse. Revue économique, vol. 69 (n° 6). pp. 1009-1023.

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenaël (2018) On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition. Games and Economic Behavior, 111. pp. 1-15.

2019

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenaël (2019) Private communication in competing mechanism games. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 183. pp. 258-283.

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa, Mariotti, Thomas and Piaser, Gwenaël (2019) Competing mechanisms and folk fheorems: two examples. TSE Working Paper, n. 19-1014, Toulouse

Attar, Andrea, Casamatta, Catherine, Chassagnon, Arnold and Décamps, Jean-Paul (2019) Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: the Role of Menus. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 51 (n° 4). pp. 977-990.

Attar, Andrea, Casamatta, Catherine, Chassagnon, Arnold and Décamps, Jean-Paul (2019) Multiple lenders, strategic default and the role of debt covenants. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 11 (n° 2). pp. 98-130.

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2019) On a Class of Smooth Preferences. Economic Theory Bulletin, vol. 7 (n° 1). pp. 37-57.

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2019) On competitive nonlinear pricing. Theoretical Economics, vol. 14 (n° 1). pp. 297-343.

2020

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2020) The social costs of side trading. The Economic Journal, vol. 130 (n° 630). pp. 1608-1622.

2021

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2021) Regulating insurance markets: multiple contracting and adverse selection. TSE Working Paper, n. 19-1033, Toulouse

2022

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenaël (2022) Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals. TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1364, Toulouse

2023

Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa, Mariotti, Thomas and Pavan, Alessandro (2023) Keeping the agents in the dark : private disclosures in competing mechanisms. TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1227, Toulouse