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Attar, Andrea
, Casamatta, Catherine, Chassagnon, Arnold and Décamps, Jean-Paul
(2019)
Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: the Role of Menus.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 51 (n° 4).
pp. 977-990.
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Abstract
We study a capital market in which multiple lenders sequentially attempt at financing a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post take-it-or-leave-it offers involves a severe loss of generality: none of the equilibrium outcomes arising in this scenario survives if lenders offer menus of contracts. This result challenges the approach followed in standard models of multiple lending. From a theoretical perspective, we offer new insights on equilibrium robustness in sequential common agency games.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Sub-title: | the Role of Menus |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | June 2019 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Multiple Lending, Menus, Strategic Default, Common Agency, Bank Competition |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse), TSM Research (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Jun 2018 15:40 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Aug 2021 13:20 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32734 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26091 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders. (deposited 16 Apr 2018 14:02)
- Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders. (deposited 22 Jun 2018 15:40) [Currently Displayed]
