2018

Yamashita, Takuro and Zhu, Shuguang (2018) On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-938, Toulouse

Zhu, Shuguang (2018) Three essays on mechanism design, information design and collective decision-making. Toulouse School of Economics (Toulouse).

2021

Yamashita, Takuro and Zhu, Shuguang (2021) Type-contingent Information Disclosure. TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1242, Toulouse, France

2022

Yamashita, Takuro and Zhu, Shuguang (2022) On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 14 (n° 4). pp. 494-514.

Larionov, Daniil, Pham, Thi-Hien, Yamashita, Takuro and Zhu, Shuguang (2022) First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition. TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1261, Toulouse, France

2025

Larionov, Daniil, Pham, Thi-Hien, Yamashita, Takuro and Zhu, Shuguang (2025) First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol.34 (n°4). pp. 889-898.

2026

Yamashita, Takuro and Zhu, Shuguang (2026) Bayesian persuasion followed by receiver’s mechanism design. Social Choice and Welfare, vol.67 (n°1). pp. 47-78.