Yamashita, Takuro
and Zhu, Shuguang
(2026)
Bayesian persuasion followed by receiver’s mechanism design.
Social Choice and Welfare, vol.67 (n°1).
pp. 47-78.
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/132172
Identification Number : 10.1007/s00355-025-01636-4
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | August 2026 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Berlin |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Sep 2026 14:33 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Sep 2026 14:37 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:132172 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54011 |

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