Yamashita, Takuro and Zhu, Shuguang (2026) Bayesian persuasion followed by receiver’s mechanism design. Social Choice and Welfare, vol.67 (n°1). pp. 47-78.

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Identification Number : 10.1007/s00355-025-01636-4
Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: August 2026
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Berlin
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Sep 2026 14:33
Last Modified: 18 Sep 2026 14:37
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:132172
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54011
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