Larionov, Daniil, Pham, Thi-Hien, Yamashita, Takuro and Zhu, Shuguang (2022) First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition. TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1261, Toulouse, France

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Abstract

We study a mechanism design model with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and I ≥ 4 agents. The principal and the agents share a common prior over the set of payoff-relevant states of the world. The principal proposes a mechanism to the agents who can then acquire information about the state of the world by privately designing a signal device. As long as it is costless for each agent to acquire a signal that is pairwise independent from the state of the world, we show that there exists a mecha-nism which allows the principal to implement any social choice rule at zero information acquisition cost to the agents.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: April 2022
Place of Publication: Toulouse, France
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2021 15:08
Last Modified: 17 Jun 2024 08:44
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:126165
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43995
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