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Ichihashi, Shota and Smolin, Alexey
(2025)
Data Provision to an Informed Seller.
Games and Economic Behavior, vol.153.
pp. 131-144.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. A designer can provide the seller with additional information, which the seller uses to price discriminate the buyer. We demonstrate the difficulty of screening the seller's information: When the buyer's value is binary, no combination of buyer surplus and seller profit can be implemented other than those achieved by providing the same information to all seller types. We use the result to characterize the set of implementable welfare outcomes and demonstrate the trade-off between buyer surplus and efficiency.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2025 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | New York |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Oct 2025 07:24 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Oct 2025 07:25 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:130996 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51255 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Data Collection by an Informed Seller. (deposited 20 Apr 2022 12:08)
- Data Provision to an Informed Seller. (deposited 13 Oct 2025 07:24) [Currently Displayed]
