Ichihashi, Shota and Smolin, Alexey (2022) Data Collection by an Informed Seller. TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1330

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A seller faces a consumer with an uncertain value for the product. The seller has imperfect private information about the value and requests additional data to set the price. The consumer can decline any request. The consumer’s willingness to provide data depends on his belief about the seller’s type which in turn depends on the request. We show that the type uncertainty limits the scope of data collection: All equilibrium payoffs are spanned by fully pooling equilibria in which the seller collects the same data regardless of the type. The seller’s private information lowers efficiency and profits, but benefits the consumer by fueling his skepticism and preventing excessive data collection. Having less private information may enable the seller to collect more data directly from the consumer and may lower the overall consumer welfare.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: April 2022
Uncontrolled Keywords: consumer privacy, data collection, information design, mechanism design, price discrimination
JEL Classification: D42 - Monopoly
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 20 Apr 2022 12:08
Last Modified: 20 Apr 2022 12:08
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:126871
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/45174
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