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Rey, Patrick
, Loertscher, Simon and Marx, Leslie M.
(2025)
All-receive procurement auctions.
TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1637, Toulouse
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Abstract
We develop the procurement analogue to an all-pay auction for an independent private values model with identical distributions. In this all-receive procurement auction (ARPA), suppliers simultaneously submit bids. Suppliers with bids below (above) the reserve are paid their bids (are paid and produce nothing). The supplier with the largest bid below the reserve produces the good. With appropriately chosen reserves, which decrease in the number of suppliers, the ARPA is efficient and, given increasing virtual costs, implements the optimal procurement. Appropriately adjusted, ARPAs implement the optimal procurement in general. ARPAs can render supply chains resilient to nonanticipated liquidity shocks.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | April 2025 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Resilience, Liquidity shocks, All-pay auctions, Multiple-receive procurement auctions |
| JEL Classification: | D44 - Auctions D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 02 May 2025 07:29 |
| Last Modified: | 02 May 2025 07:29 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:130525 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50821 |
