Martimort, DavidIdRef and Pouyet, JérômeIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3751-1552 (2025) Why is exclusivity in broadcasting rights prevalent and why does simple regulation fail? RAND Journal of Economics. (In Press)

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Abstract

Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a Convexity Property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2025
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Mount Morris, IL
Additional Information: En attente de publication pour bascule vers HAL. AT, le 30/09/2025
Uncontrolled Keywords: Broadcasting rights, upstream, downstream competition, exclusivity
JEL Classification: L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 11 Feb 2025 15:08
Last Modified: 30 Sep 2025 11:35
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:130274
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50349

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