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Martimort, David
and Pouyet, Jérôme
(2024)
Why is exclusivity in broadcasting rights prevalent and why does simple regulation fail?
RAND Journal of Economics.
(In Press)
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Abstract
Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a Convexity Property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 2024 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Mount Morris, IL |
| Additional Information: | En attente de publication pour bascule vers HAL. AT, le 17/04/2025 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Broadcasting rights, upstream, downstream competition, exclusivity |
| JEL Classification: | L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 11 Feb 2025 15:08 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Apr 2025 13:56 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:130274 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50349 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail ? (deposited 26 Jan 2024 08:23)
- Why is exclusivity in broadcasting rights prevalent and why does simple regulation fail? (deposited 11 Feb 2025 15:08) [Currently Displayed]
