Martimort, David and Pouyet, Jérôme
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3751-1552
(2025)
Why is exclusivity in broadcasting rights prevalent and why does simple regulation fail?
RAND Journal of Economics.
(In Press)
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Abstract
Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a Convexity Property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | 2025 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Place of Publication: | Mount Morris, IL |
Additional Information: | En attente de publication pour bascule vers HAL. AT, le 30/09/2025 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Broadcasting rights, upstream, downstream competition, exclusivity |
JEL Classification: | L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 11 Feb 2025 15:08 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2025 11:35 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:130274 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/50349 |
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Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail ? (deposited 26 Jan 2024 08:23)
- Why is exclusivity in broadcasting rights prevalent and why does simple regulation fail? (deposited 11 Feb 2025 15:08) [Currently Displayed]