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Crémer, Jacques
and D'Aspremont, Claude
(2024)
Bayesian implementation, efficiency, and independence classes.
TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1593, Toulouse
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/129933
Abstract
The theory of Bayesian mechanism design is of interest to economists and computer scientists alike. It has focused on two extreme assumptions on the beliefs of the agents, full-freeness (or independence) and no-freeness (or Beliefs Determine Preferences). We discuss more general conditions that cover intermediate cases between these two extremes and characterize the corresponding set of implementable mechanisms. We also discuss applications of these results to economics and to computer science.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | November 2024 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Nov 2024 09:30 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Nov 2024 09:30 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:129933 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/49878 |
