Décamps, Jean-Paul
, Gensbittel, Fabien
and Mariotti, Thomas
(2026)
The War of Attrition under Uncertainty: Theory and Robust Testable Implications.
TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1374, Toulouse
Preview |
Text
Download (1MB) | Preview |
Abstract
We study a symmetric-information war of attrition in which the players’ rewards depend on exogenous market conditions evolving as a homogeneous linear diffusion process. Using that a Markovian strategy can be represented by a stopping region along with an intensity measure of stopping, we fully characterize mixed-strategy Markov-perfect equilibria through a variational system for the players’ value functions. When players are asymmetric, in any such equilibrium each player randomizes at a discrete set of thresholds for market conditions. As a result, players may alternatively find themselves in a position of strength or weakness on the equilibrium path. Delayed concessions occur because a player currently in a position of weakness can hope for market conditions to eventually turn in his favor. In the standard duopoly model of exit under uncertainty, the firms’ stock prices and their return volatilities comove negatively over the attrition region and exhibit patterns documented by technical analysis.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 19 October 2026 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | War of Attrition, Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium, Uncertainty |
| JEL Classification: | C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Oct 2022 07:37 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Oct 2026 14:02 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:127448 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/46363 |

Tools
Tools