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Attar, Andrea
, Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenaël
(2022)
Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals.
TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1364, Toulouse
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/127377
Abstract
We study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with multiple agents. We reconsider the issue of non-existence of an equilibrium as first raised by Myerson (1982). In the context of his example, we establish the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We clarify that Myerson (1982)’s non-existence result is an implication of the additional requirement he imposes, that each principal selects his preferred continuation equilibrium in the agents’ game.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 14 September 2022 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Competing Mechanisms, Equilibrium Existence |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Sep 2022 07:37 |
| Last Modified: | 25 Nov 2022 12:00 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:127377 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/46327 |
