Tools
Tools
Pham, Thi-Hien
and Yamashita, Takuro
(2021)
Auction Design with Heterogeneous Priors.
TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1260, Toulouse
Preview |
Text
Download (402kB) | Preview |
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/126163
Abstract
We consider an auction design problem with private values, where the seller and bidders may enjoy heterogeneous priors about their (possibly correlated) valuations. Each bidder forms an (interim) belief about the others based on his own prior updated by observing his own value. If the seller faces uncertainty about the bidders’ priors, even if he knows that the bidders’ priors are within any given distance from his, he may find it worst-case optimal to propose a dominant-strategy auction mechanism.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | November 2021 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Nov 2021 15:14 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Jun 2024 08:44 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:126163 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43994 |
