Cremer, Helmuth and Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie (2021) Coinsurance vs. copayments : reimbursement rules for a monopolistic medical product with competitive health insurers. TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1223, Toulouse, France

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Abstract

This paper studies a market for a medical product in which there is perfect competition among health insurers, while the good is sold by a monopolist. Individuals di¤er in their severity of illness and there is ex post moral hazard. We consider two regimes : one in which insurers use coinsurance rates (ad valorem reimbursements) and one in which insurers use copayments (specic reimbursements). We show that the induced equilibrium with copayments involves a lower producer price and a higher level of wel- fare for consumers. This results provides strong support for a reference price based reimbursement policy.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: May 2021
Place of Publication: Toulouse, France
Uncontrolled Keywords: Ex post moral hazard, health insurance competition, copayments, imper-, fect competition
JEL Classification: I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets
I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 15 Jun 2021 08:35
Last Modified: 06 Jan 2025 13:35
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:125695
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43614

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