Cremer, Helmuth and Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie (2022) Coinsurance vs. copayments: reimbursement rules for a monopolistic medical product with competitive health insurers. Journal of Health Economics, vol. 84 (n° 102642). pp. 1-11.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102642

Abstract

This paper studies a market for a medical product in which there is perfect competition among health insurers, while the good is sold by a monopolist. Individuals di§er in their severity of illness and there is ex post moral hazard. We consider two regimes: one in which insurers use coinsurance rates (ad valorem reimbursements) and one in which insurers use copayments (speciÖc reimbursements). We show that the induced equilibrium with copayments involves a lower producer price and a higher level of wel- fare for consumers. This results provides strong support for a reference price based reimbursement policy.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: July 2022
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Ex post moral hazard, Health insurance competition, Copayments, Imperfect competition
JEL Classification: I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets
I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 13 Jan 2023 09:15
Last Modified: 31 Jul 2023 01:00
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:127009
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/45489
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