Choi, Jay Pil and Jeon, Doh-Shin (2022) Two-sided platforms and biases in technology adoption. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1143, Toulouse
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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between market structure and platforms' incentives to adopt technological innovations in two-sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and to extract surplus on the advertising side. We consider innovations that aspect the two sides in an opposite way. We compare private incentives with social incentives and find that the bias in technology adoption depends crucially on whether the non-negative pricing constraint binds or not. Our results provide a rationale for a tougher competition policy to curb concentration if competition authorities put more weight on consumer surplus in welfare calculations.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Language: | English |
Date: | February 2022 |
Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Technology Adoption, Two-Sided Platforms, Non-Negative Pricing Constraint, Pass-through |
JEL Classification: | D4 - Market Structure and Pricing L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 15 Sep 2020 08:35 |
Last Modified: | 15 Mar 2022 10:29 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:124669 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41784 |
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Platform Design Biases in Ad-Funded Two-Sided Markets. (deposited 13 Apr 2023 08:00)
- Two-sided platforms and biases in technology adoption. (deposited 15 Sep 2020 08:35) [Currently Displayed]