Ambec, Stefan and De Donder, Philippe (2020) Environmental policy with green consumerism. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1124, Toulouse

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Abstract

Is green consumerism beneficial to the environment and the economy? To shed light on this question, we study the political economy of environmental regulations in a model
with neutral and green consumers where the latter derive some warm glow from buying a good of higher environmental quality produced by a profit-maximizing monopoly,
while the good bought by neutral consumers is provided by a competitive fringe. Consumers unanimously vote for a standard set at a lower than first-best level, or for a tax
delivering the first-best environmental protection level. Despite its under-provision of environmental protection, the standard dominates the tax from a welfare perspective
due to its higher productive efficiency, i.e., a smaller gap between the environmental qualities of the two goods supplied. In stark contrast, voters unanimously prefer a tax
to a standard when the willingness to pay for greener goods is small enough.

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• Environmental policy with green consumerism. (deposited 21 Jul 2020 12:47) [Currently Displayed]
  • Environmental Policy with Green Consumerism. (deposited 05 Jan 2022 17:35)